Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension

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Innes, Robert (2000) "Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension," Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 29: No. 1, Article 11.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jls/vol29/iss1/11

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Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension

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Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When Violators Have Heterogeneous Probabilities of Apprehension